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ONLY-United States

v. Security Industrial Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
In an effort to promote the generally acknowledged goal of
debtor rehabilitation through bankruptcy legislation,' Congress has
provided that certain classes of property may be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. 2 These exemptions include such property as the
debtor's homestead and household goods. 3 To ensure the effectiveness

H.R. RE. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6087-88. The current bankruptcy code is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980). In the 1982 case of Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the 1978 Act
impermissibly enlarged the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in granting them jurisdiction
over all "civil proceedings arising under title 11 [the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to
cases under title 11." Id. at 2862 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The
jurisdictional grant empowers bankruptcy judges to hear cases "involving claims that may affect
the property of the estate once a [bankruptcy] petition has been filed." Id. In the Court's view,
such a grant of jurisdiction vests article III judicial power in non-article III judges who do not
enjoy the protections of life tenure and immunity from a reduction in salary. Id. at 2866-67. In
holding that its decision would apply only prospectively, the Court staved its judgment until
October of 1982 to give Congress the opportunity to rectify the situation. Id. at 2880. That
deadline was subsequently extended until December 24, 1982. United States v.Security Indus.
Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407, 410 n.5 (1982). To date, Congress has taken no action on the matter, and
the deadline was not extended again. Thus, bankruptcy proceedings are currently in somewhat
of a state of confusion. One of the appellees in United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct.
at 410 n.5, argued that the Northern Pipeline decision was controlling. The Supreme Court
noted, however, that because Northern Pipeline was intended to apply prospectively only, it did
not affect that case. Id.
2 Generally, the bankruptcy estate is made up of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property" as of the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
' The exemption provisions of the Code are found at 11 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. IV 1980), with
the specific property exempted being set forth at § 522(d). Generally, exempt property includes
the "homestead exemption, exemptions for personal and household goods, tools of the trade, a
small amount of jewelry, and the loan value of a life insurance policy .. .and benefits under
social security, unemployment, welfare, and pension plans, and certain tort judgments." H.R.
REP., supra note 1, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 6087 (footnote
omitted). As indicated in the legislative history of the Code, the choice and level of exemptions
have generally been considered a matter of state law. Id. To a certain extent, state law has failed
to keep pace with the needs of modern debtors and is inadequate to serve the ends of debtor
rehabilitation. Thus, the Code affords debtors the opportunity to elect between state and federal
exemptions. Id. This choice of exemptions policy has not gone unchallenged, however, given that
a state may, under certain circumstances, void a debtor's right to elect federal exemptions. 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A recent decision of the Seventh Circuit court upheld the
constitutionality of a state's power to "opt out" of the federal exemption scheme. In re Sullivan,
680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982). For a view on the potential state-federal exemption conflict, see
generally Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 58 N.C. L.
REV. 769 (1980), and Comment, Exemptions and Lien Avoidance Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 and Ohio Law, 14 AKRON L. REV. 632 (1981).
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of such exemptions, 4 Congress has further provided that regardless of
whether exemptions have been waived, 5 debtors may avoid the fixing
of certain types of liens on their property interests to the extent that
such liens would impair an otherwise allowable exemption under
section 522(f). As might be expected, the lien avoidance provision has
generated a flood of litigation in bankruptcy courts nationwide, focusing on whether the application of the provision to liens existing prior
to the enactment of the present Bankruptcy Code conflicts with fifth
amendment due process guarantees.
As the various bankruptcy courts began to address the issue, a
split emerged as to the constitutionality of retroactive application. 7
One of the key elements of disagreement was the proper analytical
approach for resolving the issue. As the cases reached the appeals
level, a similar split appeared. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, in Rodrock v. Security Industrial Bank,8 was the first appeals

4 Many courts, recognizing that one of the principal goals of a discharge in bankruptcy is to
give the debtor an opportunity to begin anew "unhampered by the pressure and discouragement
of preexisting debt," Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934), have found that liens on
exempt property that remain in effect after discharge serve to defeat the congressional aim of
providing debtors with a fresh start. See, e.g., In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404, 420 (D. Utah 1981).
Unless a debtor can avoid encumbrances on certain exempt property, the debtor would, in the
words of one court, "be left financially fresh, but without a start." In re Pommerer, 10 Bankr.
935, 946 (D. Minn. 1981).
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(e),(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
6 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. IV 1980). This section provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such a lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of the
section, if such lien is(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-(A) household
furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals,
crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal,
family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; (B) implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a
dependent of the debtor; or (C) professionally prescribed health aids for the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
Id.
, The majority of cases involving section 522(f) has dealt with the avoidance of liens arising
from nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security interests under section 522(f)(2). In this area the
courts have been sharply divided. Relatively few cases have considered the constitutionality of
section 522(f)(1), which provides for the avoidance of judicial liens, but courts that have
addressed the issue have been in virtually full agreement on the constitutionality of the statutory
provision. For an extensive list of decisions on this subject, see Note, Constitutionality of
Retroactive Lien Avoidance Under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f), 94 Hnav. L. REy. 1616,
1616 n.9 (1981).
1 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103
S. Ct. 407 (1982).
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court to decide the question. It found section 522(f)(2) unconstitutional as applied retroactively because it effected "a taking without
just compensation" in violation of the fifth amendment takings
clause.9 Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in In re Ashe,' 0 specifically declined to follow the Tenth Circuit and
upheld the constitutionality of section 522(f)(1) as applied retroactively based on its view of the expansiveness of Congress' powers under
the bankruptcy clause and the nature of bankruptcy legislation itself. 11
In assessing the constitutionality of section 522(f)(1),' 12 which
authorizes the avoidance of judicial liens, Judge Gibbons of the Third
Circuit suggested that, in fact, retroactivity was not even the issue. 13
In his view, the very purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to modify
existing legal relationships retroactively,1 4 and this power embraces
5
both the power to set uniform standards in the area of exemptions'
and the power to release debtors from their contractual obligations
retroactively.'" Operating thus on a presumption of retroactivity, the
court rejected a "just compensation" analysis as the applicable standard of scrutiny.' 7 One reason for this was its belief that Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford,18 the chief support for the use of a
"takings" analysis, had, quite simply, applied the just compensation
standard incorrectly.' 9 In the court's opinion, the just compensation
standard would apply only to instances in which private property is
appropriated for an actual public use. 20 Although it recognized that a
I

Id. at 1198.

10 669 F.2d 105 (3rd Cir. 1982). Ashe involved the application of section 522(f)(1) to a

confession of judgment note.
I Id. at 111.
12 See supra note 6 for the text of the exemption provision.
13 Judge Gibbons declared that it is in the nature of bankruptcy to operate retrospectively.
669 F.2d at 110. Thus, he did not explore the effects of retroactive application.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 109-10.
1 Id. at 110 (citing Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1819)). See infra note 63
for a discussion of Moyses.
17 669 F.2d at 110.
'8 295 U.S. 555 (1935). For a full discussion of Radford, see infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
19 669 F.2d at 111. The court also noted that the holding in Radford had been limited by
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, most notably Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain
Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
20 669 F.2d at 110. In this regard, the Ashe court was operating on a different conception of a
"taking" than the Radford court and courts basing their holdings on Radford. See infra notes 6680 and accompanying text. Particularly instructive is the Ashe court's reference to Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 437 U.S. 104 (1978). There the United States Supreme Court
observed that, while the fifth amendment prohibits the Government from forcing certain
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just compensation standard would impose certain restrictions on Congress' plenary powers, if indeed there were an appropriation of private property for a public use, 2 the court suggested that if the avoidance of the types of liens covered by section 522(f) could be classified
as a taking at all, it must be characterized as "a taking for the private
use of the Debtors, not for the general use of the public or the
particular use of a governmental agency." 2 2 The court thus perceived
the measure as designed to rearrange the relative economic positions
of the parties 23 rather than a taking of private property for a public
use. 24

Given his perception of section 522(f) as classic economic regulation, Judge Gibbons concluded that the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in the area of legislation adjusting economic priorities mandated a "rational basis" test 25 as the applicable standard of

individuals to bear burdens which should be borne by the public at large, the Government would
be rendered impotent if it were obliged to offer full compensation whenever its regulations~or
programs adversely affected some economic interest incident to property. Id. at 124. The Court
recognized that it is often difficult to distinguish between an interference resulting from legislation designed to rearrange relative economic positions in the public interest and a prohibited
taking "without just compensation." Id. at 123-24. It asserted, however, that the nature and
extent of the interference with the private rights must be so substantial as to constitute an
outright invasion of such rights. Id. at 124.
21 669 F.2d at 110. The Ashe court noted that a just compensation standard would apply
even.in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding if private property were actually appropriated
for public use. Id. (citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); New
Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270 (3d
Cir. 1974)).
22 669 F.2d at 110. Justice Blackmun also adopted this view in United States v. Security Ind.
Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407, 415 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
23 669 F.2d at 111.
24 Id. at 110.
25 The court adopted as the applicable standard of scrutiny the test set forth in United States
v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Carolene Productsinvolved a fifth amendment due
process challenge to a legislative provision prohibiting the interstate shipment of adulterated
skim milk. Id. at 146. The Court first characterized the prohibition of the shipment of such milk
as a permissible exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 152. It stated
unequivocally that the constitutionality of regulatory legislation which affected ordinary commercial transactions would be upheld if there were any set of facts tending to support the
assumption "that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators." Id.
This application of a rational basis test to bankruptcy legislation had already appeared,
though under a different label, as early as Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
There the Supreme Court held that Congress may promulgate any regulations in the area of
bankruptcy provided they are "not so grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with fundamental law." Id. at 192. Moreover, recent decisions of the Supreme Court have also indicated
that legislation adjusting the relative economic positions of various parties is presumed to be
constitutional unless it can be shown "that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). For a discussion of Usery, see
infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny. 26 Noting the breadth of Congress' power to achieve the
recognized end of debtor rehabilitation,2 7 the court concluded that
Congress' decision to permit a debtor to avoid a creditor device in
direct conflict with the "fresh start" aim of a discharge in bankruptcy 28 was a rational way of striking the balance between debtor
rehabilitation and payment of creditors.2 9 In reply to the argument
that the bankruptcy power does not extend to an impairment of the
property rights of secured creditors, Judge Gibbons reiterated that the
bankruptcy power is limited only by the requirements of rational basis
review. 30 In this regard, the court noted the general acceptance of
Congress' power to enact bankruptcy laws affecting property rights
arising out of a contractual relationship created under state law.31
From this proposition the court reasoned that such a situation should
logically extend as well to property rights conferred by contract and
considered liens on specific property under state law. 32 While acknowledging that congressional action in the area of security interests
could lead to widespread reluctance to extend credit, 33 Judge Gibbons
asserted that such a situation was beyond the scope of judicial inquiry,
the court's only concern being whether the actual congressional choice
34
rests on some rational basis.
The view espoused in In re Ashe was adopted subsequently by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In re Gifford, 35 thus
setting the stage for resolution of the retroactivity issue by the United
States Supreme Court. Given the divergence of opinion and the anticipation with which final resolution was awaited in the business community, 36 the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Security
IndustrialBank 37 warrants closer analysis.

26 669 F.2d

at 110.

27 Id. at 110-11; see supra note 1.
28 See supra note 4.
29 669 F.2d at 111.
30

Id.

31 Id.
32

Id.

33 Id.
34

Id.

688 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1982).
36 Indicative of the interest the case aroused is the fact that on the day after the decision was
handed down, the case was prominently reported in such publications as the New York Times,
see N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1982, at DI, col. 1., the Wall Street Journal, see Wall St. J., Dec. 1,
1982, at 4, col. 1., the New York Law Journal, see N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 2, and
American Banker, see Am. Banker, Dec. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 3., the latter two papers giving the
decision front page coverage.
7 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
15
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In Security Industrial Bank the Court considered seven cases
consolidated for appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 38 In each of the seven cases the debtors obtained a loan from the
creditors and granted them, as collateral for the loan, a security
interest in what was essentially every household good they owned. 39
This personal property ranged from kitchenware and sewing machines 40 to television sets and furniture, 4 1 and, in at least two cases,
none of the items was worth more than $200.42 The security interests
were nonpossessory nonpurchase-money interests4 3 under which the
debtors retained possession of the property purportedly serving as
collateral for the loan. The proceeds of the loan were not used to
44
purchase the collateral therefor.
The liens in question had been acquired prior to the enactment of
the present Bankruptcy Code. 4 5 In each case, however, the debtor
filed for bankruptcy after the effective date of the Code, 46 which
11The cases involved were Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank and Stevens v. Liberty Loan
Corp., 4 Bankr. 293 (D. Colo. 1980); Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank and Knezel v. Security
Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. 629 (D. Colo. 1980); Hoops v. Freedom Fin. & Security Indus. Bank, 3
Bankr. 635 (D. Colo. 1980); Schulte v. Beneficial Fin. of Kansas, Inc. and Hunter v. Beneficial
Fin. of Kansas, Inc., 8 Bankr. 12 (D. Kan. 1980) [af'd sub nom. Rodrock v. Security Indus.
Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nora. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103
S. Ct. 407 (1982)].
19 103 S. Ct. at 409.
40 Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. 629, 630-31 n.2 (D. Colo. 1980), aff'd, 642
F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), af'd sub nom. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407
(1982). In Rodrock, the total value of the collateral used was $580, while in Knezel v. Security
Indus. Bank, the collateral was worth $540. Id.
1' One of the chief criticisms of this type of security interest is that it covers items with
basically no resale value. See H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 127, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWs at 6088. One bankruptcy court, describing the interests as " 'dragnet' security
interests," noted that the goods subject to such liens have generally only "garage sale" value and
that "[a]dministrative burdens and expenses, as well as the absence of any market, make salvage
and resale impracticable." In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404, 406 (D. Utah 1981).
42 See Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. 293, 294 (D. Colo. 1980), af'd sub nom.
Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), af'd sub nom. United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982). Under section 522(d)(3), the debtor may claim an
exemption of a maximum of $200 in any particular item. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
41 103 S. Ct. at 409. As defined by one court, "[t]he taking of a security interest in property
which is already owned by the debtor results in the creation of merely a non-purchase money
security interest." First Hardin Nat'l Bank v. Damron, 5 Bankr. 357, 358 (W.D. Ky. 1980)
(emphasis in original). This is in contrast to the situations in which a seller retains an interest in
an item purchased to secure payment or one person advances funds to another to enable that
person to acquire rights in specific property, both of which arrangements give rise to a purchasemoney security interest. Id.
44 103 S. Ct. at 409. This is the nature of such an interest. See supra note 43.
4 103 S. Ct. at 409. The current Bankruptcy Code was enacted by Congress on October 6,
1978 and signed into law on November 6, 1978. Rodrock, 642 F.2d at 1195.
6 103 S. Ct. at 409. The Code became effective on October 1, 1979. Id. A number of cases
have dealt with the issue whether section 522(f)(2) is intended to apply during the post-
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provided for the exclusion from the bankruptcy estate of certain items
of personal property covered by the respective creditors' liens. 4' The
debtors sought to avoid these liens under section 522(f)(2), claiming an
exemption for the various household goods collateralizing the security
agreements previously entered into. 48 The effect of allowing the exemptions would have been to relegate the nonpossessory nonpurchasemoney creditors to the rank of unsecured creditors. 4 This status guaranteed them only minimal payment on their claims, which amounted,
50
in certain cases, to an entitlement of only one dollar.
In objecting to the claims for exemptions, the affected creditors
asserted that to permit debtors to avoid a lien incident to a security
interest that had vested prior to the enactment date of the Bankruptcy
Code would amount to a deprivation of rights in specific property in
violation of fifth amendment due process guarantees. 5' The Tenth
Circuit, in reliance on the 1935 Supreme Court decision in Louisville
Joint Stock Bank v. Radford,52 agreed. Although it acknowledged that
Congress may, in the exercise of its bankruptcy powers, discharge a
debtor from his contractual obligations,5 3 the court declared that such
powers do not extend to the taking of a creditor's vested rights in
specific property for the benefit of a debtor. 54 The court noted that the
avoidance provision would work an even more severe impairment of
the secured creditor's rights than did the moratorium on mortgage
foreclosure proceedings in Radford55 because the creditor ultimately

enactment pre-effective, or "gap," period. The highest court to consider the question thus far has
determined that section 522(f) may constitutionally be applied to nonpossessory nonpurchasemoney security interests arising during that eleven month period. See In re Webber, 674 F.2d
796 (9th Cir. 1982). Noting that all of the liens in Security IndustrialBank arose pre-enactment,
the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the issue of post-enactment pre-effective liens.
103 S. Ct. at 414 n.1l.
47 103 S. Ct. at 409; see supra note 3.
11 103 S. Ct. at 409; see supra note 6.
11 See Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. 629, 630 (D. Colo. 1980), a.f-'d, 642 F.2d
1193 (10th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nor. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407
(1982).
50 See id.

5' Schulte v. Beneficial Fin. of Kansas, Inc., 8 Bankr. 8, 14 (D. Kan. 1980); Jackson v.
Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. 293, 294 (D. Colo. 1980); Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 3
Bankr. 629, 630 (D. Colo. 1980); Hoops v. Freedom Fin. & Security Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. 635,
636 [alffrd sub norn. Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981). af'd sub
nom. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982)].
52 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
3 642 F.2d at 1197.
54 Id.
11 Id. at 1197 n.4. For a discussion of Radford and the way in which the interest at stake was
affected by section 75(s) of the Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934, see infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
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would be deprived of all rights in the collateral. 56 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit held invalid the application of section 522(f)(2) to security
interests that had vested before the 1978 Code was enacted. 5 7 The
United States, which had intervened in each case, appealed 58 and the
59
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Justice Rehnquist affirmed the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.6 0 The Court noted that it
would address the constitutional issues raised by retroactive application of section 522(f)(2) only to the extent necessary to ascertain
whether such application posed sufficiently serious questions as to its
constitutionality to justify the Court's disposing of the case through
statutory construction rather than resolution of the underlying constitutional issue. 6 ' The Court began this exercise by defining the analytical approach it would employ. In reply to the Government's argument that section 522(f)(2) represented a rational exercise of the
powers granted to Congress under the bankruptcy clause, 62 the Court
asserted that while such an attempt to provide debtors with a fresh
start was indeed rational, and while the bankruptcy power had traditionally been used to release debtors from their contract liabilities
retroactively,6 3 an entirely distinct constitutional analysis is required
642 F.2d at 1197 n.4.
Id. at 1198.
103 S. Ct. at 410.
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 102 S. Ct. 969 (1982).
103 S. Ct. at 414.
61 Id. at 412 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978)).
Lorillard was a recent case
employing a judicial preference for statutory construction. Such an approach is not new. As
expressed by Justice White early in this century:
It is elementary when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be
reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to adopt that construction which
will save the statute from constitutional infirmity . . . . [T]he rule plainly must
mean that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions
are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1908) (citations omitted).
62 103 S. Ct. at 410.
63 Id. In acknowledging Congress' authority to impair contractual obligations, the Court
made reference to its 1902 decision in Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). In
that case, the creditor recovered a judgment on a promissory note against the debtor in Mississippi where the debtor was domiciled. After the judgment was rendered, the debtor changed his
domicile to the State of Tennessee where he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy seeking a
discharge from all his debts, including the creditor's outstanding judgment against him. Over the
creditor's objection, the Court upheld the legislation authorizing discharge of the debt. Id. at
182-84. This case is advanced by those supporting the constitutionality of section 522(f) as the
leading authority for the proposition that Congress has been granted plenary power to regulate
in the areas of bankruptcy, which grant empowers Congress to "discharge the debtor from his
contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property." Id. at 188; see, e.g., In re
7
5
5
o
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where bankruptcy legislation seeks to impair property interests retroactively.6 4 In such cases, the Court declared, the pertinent issue is
whether private property is taken without just compensation, 65 6a6
standard developed in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.
Radford, a 1935 decision of the United States Supreme Court,
had invalidated section 75(s) of the Frazier-Lemke Act of 193467
which enabled a mortgagor in financial distress to purchase the mortgaged property at an appraised value under a deferred payment plan
but with immediate possession. 68 Failing approval of such an arrangement by the mortgagee, 69 the mortgagor would be permitted to apply
to the court for a five year moratorium on all foreclosure proceedings,
paying a reasonable rental value to be distributed among the mortgagor's secured and unsecured creditors. 70 In striking down the provision, the Court observed that measures for the relief of mortgagors in
distress had always been founded on the preservation of the mortgagees' substantive rights because compensation in the form of full
payment of the debt with interest was contemplated. 7 ' No prior bankruptcy legislation had ever attempted "to enlarge the rights or privileges of the mortgagor as against the mortgagee." ' 72 While acknowledging Congress' ability to discharge a debtor from personal
obligations under its broad bankruptcy powers, 73 the Court in Radford asserted that the legislation in question did not, in fact, seek to
discharge the debtor from his contractual liabilities,74 but sought
instead to permit the mortgagor to retain possession of the mortgaged
Gifford, 688 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Ashe, 669 F.2d 105 (3rd Cir. 1982); In re Ward, 14
Bankr. 549 (S.D. Ga. 1981); In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404 (D. Utah 1981). Of particular interest to
those who seek to apply section 522(f) retroactively is the Moyses Court's observation that all
debts are created subject to Congress' expansive bankruptcy powers. 186 U.S. at 189. Persons
who challenge the constitutionality of section 522(f) as applied retroactively maintain that
Moyses addressed the impairment of contract rights only and did not extend Congress' bankruptcy powers to permit the impairment of property rights. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at
1621.
11 103 S. Ct. at 410.
65 Id.
66 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
67 Pub. L. No. 486, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934) (amended 1935).
"1 295 U.S. at 575. Payments were to be graduated at the rate of 2.5% within two years,
2.5% within three years, 5% within four years, 5% within five years and the outstanding
balance within six years, with a yearly interest rate of 1% on all deferred payments. Id.
66 The mortgagee's refusal to agree to immediate purchase on the deferred payments basis
would bring the parties within the scope of paragraph 7 of section 75(s). Id. This paragraph was
the provision in controversy in Radford.
70 295 U.S. at 575-76.
7'
Id. at 579.
72 Id. at 582.
71 Id. at 589.
71 Id. at 590.
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premises. 75 Such a law operated, in the Court's opinion, to deprive the
mortgagee of substantial rights in specific property without compensation,76 thereby resulting in a significant impairment of the mortgagee's security interest. 77 In reply to the mortgagor's contention that
such impairment was not "arbitrary and unreasonable" 78 because it
resulted from legislation enacted to remedy a national economic emergency,7 the Court concluded that regardless of the nature and extent
of the public interest, "private property shall not be thus taken even
for a wholly public use without just compensation.

'

8

0

In view of its earlier decision in Radford, the Court in Security
IndustrialBank emphasized that no matter how "rational" particular
bankruptcy legislation may be, it must be examined in terms of
whether it effects a "taking" in violation of fifth amendment guarantees. 8 Thus, the Court adopted a "takings" approach and rejected the
Government's suggestion that "rational basis" review be employed. In
a further effort to avoid application of the "takings" prohibition, the
Government argued that what was "taken" in this case was not,
strictly speaking, "property" as that term had traditionally been defined for due process purposes. 82 In this connection, the Government
'

76

Id.

at 594.

Id. at 601-02. In deciding that the Frazier-Lemke Act operated to deprive the mortgagee

of substantive rights in specific property acquired under state law, the Radford Court pointed to
five property rights held by the mortgagee:
1. The right to retain the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is paid.
2. The right to realize upon the security by a judicial public sale.
3. The right to determine when such sale shall be held, subject only to the discretion
of the court.
4. The right to protect its interest in the property by bidding at such sale whenever
held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged property devoted primarily to the
satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt of the proceeds of a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself.
5. The right to control meanwhile the property during the period of default, subject
only to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents and profits collected by a
receiver for the satisfaction of the debt.
Id. at 594-95. Section 75(s) was subsequently upheld in amended form. See Wright v. Vinton
Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). For an account of the ultimate
evisceration of Radford's "five property rights," see In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404, 414 n.15 (D. Utah
1981).
17
71

295 U.S. at 595.
Id. at 598.

71 Id. The debtor in Radford attempted to characterize section 75(s) as legislation enacted for
a "permissible public purpose," namely to alleviate the economic distress of mortgagors during
the Depression. Id. This formulation seems to be responsible, in part, for the confusion the
Radford decision has engendered. As indicated infra at notes 141-50, the "public use" concept
under the fifth amendment taking clause involves an entirely different set of circumstances.

1o Id. at 602.
8' 103 S. Ct. at 410.
82 Id. at 410-11.
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suggested that because the Supreme Court had, in certain instances,
expanded the notion of "property" to provide due process protection
to common law contract rights, 83 then by the same token property
rights and contract rights should be afforded the same measure of
protection under the takings clause. 84 The Government argued further
that bankruptcy legislation had traditionally placed all creditors on a
more or less equal footing, 85 treating secured and unsecured creditors
in much the same way. 8 6 In reply to these contentions, the Court
stated simply, without further elaboration, that regardless of how
bankruptcy legislation had resolved the contract right-property right
dichotomy, "the contractual right of a secured creditor to obtain
repayment of his debt may be quite different in legal contemplation
87
from the property right of the same creditor in the collateral.
11 Id. The Government made reference to two Supreme Court decisions that had labeled as
"property" certain rights which had theretofore not been specifically considered as such. In
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969), the Court was asked to decide whether the termination
of welfare benefits without an evidentiary hearing prior to termination constituted a due process
violation. Id. at 255. In considering the nature of the right, the Court noted that welfare benefits
are a "matter of statutory entitlement for the persons entitled to receive them," id. at 262, and
should be viewed "as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity'." Id. at n.8. The dissent in Goldberg
found that this characterization "somewhat strains credulity." Id. at 275 (Black, J., dissenting).
In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1973), the Suprerne Court addressed the issue of whether
the standard and procedure for discharge of nonprobationary civil servants complied with due
process guarantees. Id. at 147-48. In holding that they did, the Court noted that the petitioner's
"expectancy of employment" was properly characterized as a property interest, but was conditioned on the procedural limitations set forth in the legislation creating the right. Id. at 155.
84 103 S. Ct. at 411.
85 Id.
86 Id. One bankruptcy court, in an exhaustive historical discussion, argued that bankruptcy
legislation is founded on a principle of equality among creditors, with the focus being on the
amount of creditors' respective debts, rather than the nature of the debts. In re Pillow, 8 Bankr.
404, 421-24 (D. Utah 1981). Citing sources covering bankruptcy legislation from colonial America to the days of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Pillow court noted that the tradition of lien
avoidance and subordination of security interests under certain circumstances illustrates the
blurring of the distinction between secured and unsecured creditors. Id. at 423. This argument
goes too far, however. While bankruptcy does operate on a principle of "equality among
creditors," it also operates on the basis of classes of creditors, with due deference being given to
the nature of the claim of each class.
87 103 S. Ct. at 411. While the Court was resisting any attempt to equate contract rights and
property rights, see infra notes 160-63, its formulation raises an issue which is not then addressed.
The Court cites to Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), which it viewed as
limiting Congress' bankruptcy powers to the impairment of contracts. See supra note 63. It then
cites Radford, apparently for the proposition that "the position of a secured creditor, who has
rights in specific property, differs fundamentally from that of an unsecured creditor, who has
none." 295 U.S. at 588. What the Court does not consider, however, is what rights the creditor
acquired in the property and whether, in fact, the "property right" asserted may, in fact, be no
more than incidental to, rather than distinct from, the contractual right to be paid. For
consideration of the latter view, see generally, In re Pommerer, 10 Bankr. 935, 947 (D. Minn.
1981); In re Paden, 10 Bankr. 206, 209 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Mahoney, 15 Bankr. 482, 484
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The Court, in considering the effect of retroactive application,
declared that retroactive application of section 522(f)(2) to avoid the
liens in question would serve to abridge the creditors' property rights
in toto.88 The Government, while not disputing that the creditors'
interest would be effectively destroyed, contended that the interest of
a nonpossessory nonpurchase-money lienor is "insubstantial,"89 thus
providing a ground for distinction. The Court summarily dismissed
the argument with a statement to the effect that although "[t]he
'bundle of rights' which accrues to a secured party is obviously smaller
than that which accrues to an owner in fee simple," 90 the interest of a
secured creditor is nonetheless property. Support for this proposition
was found in Radford and Armstrong v. United States. 9'
In Armstrong, another "takings" case, petitioners supplied materials to a shipbuilder who had entered into a contract with the United
States for the construction of navy boats. 92 The Government's agreement stipulated that default on the part of the shipbuilder would
entitle the Government to take title to and possession of all work,
completed and uncompleted, along with all construction materials
acquired. 93 Upon the shipbuilder's default, the Government did indeed exercise its rights and took possession of all unused materials,
including those supplied by petitioners and for which petitioners had
not been paid.9 4 Petitioners objected, claiming that the Government
had destroyed their liens9 5 on the boat hulls and on material they had

(W.D.N.C. 1981); Note, Bankruptcy-Section 522(J) of the 1978 Code- Constitutionalityof Its
Application to Security Interests Pre-DatingEnactment of the Code, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1281,
1300-02 (1981).
11 103 S. Ct. at 411.
89 Id.
90 Id. This reply to the Government's argument misses the point entirely. The Government
was not contending that anything other than property was involved. Rather, the Government
was urging the Court to examine exactly what rights the lien conferred upon the holder and to
distinguish the lien from the types of interests generally afforded fifth amendment protection.
See infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text. The characterization of the nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security interest as an "insubstantial" property right has been the subject of
much comment. In support of this view, see generally In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 456 (7th Cir.
1982); In re Ward, 14 Bankr. 549, 561 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
' 364 U.S. 40 (1961).
12 Id. at
41.
93

Id.

94

Id.

"IThe liens

asserted to have been destroyed were authorized under ME. REV. STAT. Ch. 178,
§ 13 (1954) which provided that any person who "furnishes labor or materials for building a
vessel has a lien on it therefor, which may be enforced by attachment thereof within 4 days after
it is launched .. . .He also has a lien on the materials furnished before they become part of the
vessel, which may be enforced by attachment.
...
364 U.S. at 41.
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furnished, in violation of the fifth amendment takings clause.9 6 Finding the materialmen's right to attach specific property for the satisfaction of their claims to be a compensable property interest within the
meaning of the fifth amendment,9 7 the Supreme Court agreed. The
Court acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing between a compensable taking by the government and the abrogation of an interest
as a consequence of valid regulation.9" Nonetheless, the Court held
that the Government had acquired a direct benefit by precluding
enforcement of the materialmen's liens through its contract enabling it
to take title to materials subject to the liens of persons who were not
parties to the contract.99 As a direct beneficiary, therefore, the Government was required to compensate the lienors for the value of the
liens destroyed. 00
The Government in the instant case argued that Armstrong was
not controlling because section 522(f)(2) did not effect a taking of
private property for the Government's own use.' 0' Rather, the Government asserted, section 522(f)(2) is of a purely economic nature and
is designed to adjust priorities among various private parties. 0 2 In
response to this argument, the Court pointed out that certain governmental action had been previously characterized as a taking despite
the fact that it had not involved an "outright acquisition . ..by the
government for itself."'' 0 3 Notwithstanding, the Government urged
96 364 U.S. at 42.

o Id. at 44. In support of this holding, the Court relied on its decision in Radford. The Court
noted that the petitioners had made no attempt to enforce their lien through attachment, but
indicated nonetheless that they were entitled to attach the specific property to satisfy their claim.
Id. Additionally, the Court stated that the lien had attached to the material 'by operation of
law" and found no basis for permitting the owner of the property to impair that right of
attachment through a contract with another party. Id. at 45.
IId. at 48-49.
IId.
ld. at 49. The relevance of Armstrong to a determination of the constitutionality of section
Io
522(f)(2) was also suggested in Note, supra note 7, at 1630-31. A contrary view was expressed by
the Seventh Circuit, however, in In re Gifford, 668 F.2d 447, 456 (7th Cir. 1982), where the
court distinguished a nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security interest from a farm mortgage
or materialman's lien. The court noted that a mortgage or materialman's lien "attach[es] to
property of the debtor that has directly benefited from the loan or work done." Id. The lien in
Armstrong arose, for example, because Armstrong has supplied the shipbuilder with the very
materials appropriated by the Government. With the nonpossessory nonpurchase-money lienholder, on the other hand, "the borrowed money .. .was not lent to purchase or improve the
household goods listed in the security agreement." Id. Moreover, section 522(f) does not provide
a direct benefit to the Government as did the appropriation in Armstrong. Id. at 460.
10 103 S. Ct. at 412.
'01 Id. For a similar view, see In re Ashe, 669 F.2d 105 (3rd Cir. 1982); In re Gifford, 668
F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1982); see also infra notes 177-92 and accompanying text.
103 103 S. Ct. at 412 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct.
3164 (1982); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980): Pennsylvania Coal Co.
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that a taking analysis was inappropriate in view of the value of the
liens to the creditors holding them, namely as an instrument of leverage rather than a means of foreclosure. 0 4 Although the Court did not
reject this suggestion categorically, it found the state's characterization of the liens as property to be more compelling and did not explore
the argument further. 0 5 The Court thus concluded that there was
considerable doubt as to whether section 522(f)(2) would pass constitutional muster if applied retroactively and sought a way to apply it
06
prospectively only.
In attempting to divine the congressional intent as to retroactivity, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had concluded that
section 522(f)(2) would necessarily apply retroactively because if it
applied prospectively only, no law would apply to cases filed after the
effective date of the Code but involving security interests taken prior
07
to that date given that the old bankruptcy act had been repealed.1
The Supreme Court found this approach inadequate. While noting
that the 1978 Code applies to all bankruptcy petitions filed after the
effective date, 0 8 the Court suggested that Congress may well have

v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). These cases may be readily distinguished from the instant case.
In Loretto, the Court considered the effect of a state statute requiring landlords to permit the
installation of cable television facilities on their property. 102 S. Ct. at 3169. The Court found
that the regulation resulted in a taking without compensation, but the holding revolved around
the permanent, physical nature of the intrusion on real property. Id. at 3171. Indeed, the Court
noted that its holding was limited to cases of a permanent physical occupation, id. at 3179, and
recognized that regulations may legitimately be imposed restricting the use of private property.
Id. at 3172, 3179. In Pruneyard, the Court examined whether a state could require a shopping
center owner to permit the dissemination of pamphlets and petitions on its property. 447 U.S. at
749. In holding that it could, the Court asserted that the temporary physical invasion of property
authorized by the state did not amount to a taking because the owner's right to exclude certain
individuals was not shown to be "essential" to the use or economic value of [the] property." Id. at
754. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court considered whether a prohibition on the removal
of coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of homes, streets or buildings constituted a
taking. 206 U.S. at 412-13. The Court held that although the government need not compensate
individuals for every diminution in the value of their property, id. at 413, an act which makes it
commercially impossible to use property for the purpose for which it was acquired diminishes
property beyond the permissible limits. Id. at 415. Of the three cases, only Pennsylvania Coal
would seem to be applicable to the instant case if section 522(f) is viewed as a use restriction.
Pennsylvania Coal does, however, also fall within the category of a permanent physical invasion
within the meaning of Loretto.
104 103 S. Ct. at 412.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107

642 F.2d at 1196-97.

108 103 S. Ct. at 413. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun declared that he saw

"nothing in the statute . . . that speaks or hints of only prospective applicability or that compels
it." Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Seventh Circuit, in determining the scope of
application of section 522(0, noted that of all the substantive provisions of the current Bank-
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intended that property rights be impaired only in connection with
liens arising after the Code was enacted.109 If this is true of section
522(f)(2), then the other provisions of the Code would still apply to
the liens because they exist independently under state law." 0
On the question of application of legislation generally, the Court
declared it beyond dispute that legislation operates prospectively,
unless retroactivity be the" 'manifest intention of the legislature.' "I"
This is particularly true where retroactive application would serve to
abridge previously acquired rights. 1 2 As an example of the application of this principle in the bankruptcy context, the Court referred to
its 1914 decision in Holt v. Henley.1 3 The creditor in Holt had installed a sprinkler system on the premises of the eventual bankrupt,
under a conditional sales agreement specifying that the system would
remain the property of the creditor until it was paid for." 4 A statute
enacted subsequent to the date of the agreement placed the bankruptcy trustee in the position of a lienholder with a prior claim. " 5 The
Supreme Court refused to read the amendment in such a way as to
destroy the rights of the creditor, finding that retroactive application
would "impute to the act of Congress an intent to take away rights
lawfully retained, and unimpeachable at the moment when they took
their start."" 6 Similarly, the Court in the instant case declared that
while bankruptcy legislation had traditionally been held to apply to

ruptcy Code, only section 522(f) gives no indication as to when it is to apply. It held, however,
that because no exception was carved out for section 522(f) in the provision of the Code
stipulating that only the 1978 Code was to apply to proceedings commenced after the effective
date, then the provision necessarily applied retroactively. See In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 450
(7th Cir. 1982).
109103 S. Ct. at 413.
110Id.
" Id. (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)).
I2 103 S. Ct. at 413.
113 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
"4 Id. at 638.
Is
Id. at 639. Under the applicable state law, the type of sales arrangement entered into was
void "as to creditors . . . and as to purchasers for value without notice from the vendee," id. at
638-39, unless the sale was registered. Several months after the conditional sales contract was
executed, the eventual bankrupt executed a mortgage deed purportedly covering the existing and
after-acquired plant on the mortgaged premises. Thus, in addition to the bankruptcy trustee,
who was claiming priority over the conditional seller by virtue of an amendment to the bankruptcy laws, the mortgagees were also claiming priority by virtue of the mortgagor's acquisition
of the sprinkler system during the term of the mortgage. Id. at 640. The Court also dismissed the
latter claim finding that the mortgagees were not purchasers for value as against the conditional
seller because the sprinkler system had been installed after the mortgage was executed and the
mortgagees had thus "made no advance on the faith of it." Id. at 640-41.
"I Id. at 640.
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preexisting contract rights," 7 there was no precedent for extending
such applicability to preexisting property rights." 8 Thus the Court
held that section 522(f)(2) should not be interpreted to destroy preexisting property rights because Congress had not clearly indicated its
intention that it do so." 9 This holding, in turn, permitted the Court to
avoid resolution of the underlying constitutional issue.
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, found the instant case
to be indistinguishable from Holt because it too had involved "a preexisting agreement, a subsequent change in the then Bankruptcy Act,
and the Court's preservation of the pre-existing right." 20 Finding Holt
dispositive on that ground alone, he asserted that the statute should be
held to apply prospectively only and that the majority should have
2
refrained from examining the legislation in the context of a taking.' '
Were it not for Holt, however, Justice Blackmun would have reached
the constitutional issue and found retroactive application both valid
and appropriate. 22 While acknowledging that the measure in question could well be a "rational" exercise of Congress' bankruptcy
powers, 23 Justice Rehnquist had avoided all reference to the congressional purpose underlying section 522(f). Justice Blackmun, however,
appeared to suggest that Congress' purpose in enacting the provision
and the nature of the interest avoided were of predominant importance. On the one hand, he characterized the section 522(f) (2) exemptions as both designed "to protect the debtor's essential needs and to

"1 103 S. Ct. at 413 (citing Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902)); see
supra note 63.
"1 103 S. Ct. at 413. In this connection, the Court distinguished certain cases advanced by the
Government in support of its argument that bankruptcy legislation may impair previously
acquired property rights. See id. at 413 n.10 (distinguishing Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141 (1944) (tax benefits, not property rights, involved); Dickinson Indus.
Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382 (1940) (change in procedural rules not affecting property
rights)). With regard to Carpenter v. Wabash By., 309 U.S. 23 (1940), another case cited by the
Government, the Court noted that while giving personal injury judgment creditors priority over
mortgagees "may have disadvantaged the mortgagees by reducing the amount of cash available
to pay their notes, it did not affect their property right in the collateral securing the mortgages."
103 S. Ct. at 414 n. 10. It is difficult to see how this differs from section 522(f), since both statutes
rearrange priority positions and diminish the amount of funds available for the satisfaction of
particular debts. Section 522(0, in conjunction with section 522(d), provides for the protection of
exemptions up to clearly specified amounts. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. IV 1980). Section
522(d) is not a blanket exemption. If, in practical effect, the lien of a nonpossessory nonpurchasemoney lienholder is totally avoided, it is due to the limited worth of the collateral and its
disproportionate value with respect to the amount of the loan.
"1 103 S.Ct. at 414.
120 Id. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
12
Id. at 410.

1983]

NOTES

enable him to have a fresh start economically,"' 24 and "limited as to
kinds of property and as to values." 1 25 On the other hand, he noted,
the amount of the lien is disproportionate to the value of the property; 126 moreover, because the liens are general, they attach to no
specific property and the lienholder has no power to prevent the
27
debtor from disposing of the property allegedly supporting the liens.
Additionally, Justice Blackmun viewed the lien avoidance measure as
a congressional response to abuse by creditors whose arrangements
with debtors amount to contracts of adhesion and who use these
devices to threaten debtors to maintain payments even after a discharge in bankruptcy rather than with any true intention of foreclosing on the collateral.' 28 Justice Blackmun contended that the statute
represented an economic regulation which attempted to adjust priorities.' 29 Therefore, he suggested that a "takings" analysis was inappropriate because no private property had been appropriated for a public
use. 130

By applying a strict takings standard to section 522(f), the majority in the instant case demonstrated that it was not prepared, as was
the concurrence, to permit economic realities to influence its decisions
in the area of lien avoidance. This position, as well as the Court's
presumption of prospectivity in the area of bankruptcy legislation in
reliance on such cases as Holt v. Henley, raises a number of issues.
First, it is questionable whether Holt v. Henley is necessarily controlling authority in this case. Second, the Court, by adhering to the
Radford "takings" rationale, fails to recognize what post-Radford
decisions have emphasized, namely that Congress may, in the exercise
of its bankruptcy powers, affect property rights in many ways provided the congressional action does not amount to an unreasonable
124
125
126

Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d),(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J.,concurring). The disproportionate relationship between

the amount of the lien and the value of the collateral purportedly securing it is one of the
arguments most frequently advanced in support of retroactive application of section 522(f). See,
e.g., In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 456 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Rapp, 16 Bankr. 575, 579 (S.D. Fla.
1981); In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404, 419 (D. Utah 1981); In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395, 400 (N.D.
Ohio 1980).
127103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
.2 Id. This was one of the Government's principal contentions. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text. This recognition of the value to creditors of nonpossessory nonpurchasemoney security interests in household goods is reflected in the legislative history of the statute as
well. See H.R. REP., supra note 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNc. & An. NEWs 5963.
29 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This view of section 522(f) as economic
regulation was adopted by two courts of appeals prior to the decision in this case. See In re
Gifford, 688 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Ashe, 669 F.2d 105 (3rd Cir. 1982); see also infra
notes 180-92 and accompanying text.
130 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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impairment of such rights.' Third, even assuming that Radford may
furnish the proper analytical framework for dealing with cases arising
under section 522(f)(2), the court does not explore whether a different
constitutional approach may be equally justified given the nature and
purpose of the legislation at issue.
In Holt, the Court applied a presumption against retroactivity to
a statute placing trustees in bankruptcy in the position of a lienholder
with priority over creditors who sold under a conditional sales contract. 32 While it is true that the Court in Holt construed the statute as
affecting only property rights arising after the statute became effective, 33 thereby preserving the rights of the conditional seller, Holt
would appear to be distinguishable from Security Industrial Bank
because the legislation in question was of an entirely different nature.
First of all, title remained with the creditor in Holt 134 and the statute,
if applied retroactively, would operate to divest the creditor of title.
In addition, by giving the bankruptcy trustee priority status, the
35
measure served to enhance the size of the bankruptcy estate,
thereby adding to the assets of the debtor to be distributed to his
creditors. Therefore, the measure in fact served to benefit certain
classes of creditors in the form of increased distributions at the expense
of the creditor whose lien was subordinated to the lien of the
trustee. 36 In effect, the legislation did not benefit the debtor directly
because the property was ultimately to be distributed to his creditors.
The lien avoidance provision being challenged in this case, however, serves an entirely different purpose. It is designed to allow the
debtor to retain what is, in fact, but a minimal amount of personal
property representing the basic necessities required for a "fresh start"

See, e.g.. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937).
232 U.S. at 639.
133 See id.
Id. at 638. Under the terms of the agreement with the debtor, the sprinkler system was to
I3'
remain the property of the creditor until it was paid for. In addition, the creditor reserved the
right to remove the system from the premises upon default by the debtor. Id.
13'The bankruptcy trustee functions as the representative of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 323
(Supp. IV 1980). In his capacity as representative of the estate, he attends to the "proper
disposition of the debtor's property to his creditors." 1 L. KING, COLLiER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL
323.02 (3d ed. 1981). In order to carry out this duty, title to all of the bankrupt's nonexempt
property must vest in the trustee. Id. The basic contention in Holt was that retroactive application of this provision in question would have given the trustee title to property that he would not
otherwise have had, thereby adding that asset to the distributable estate. 232 U.S. at 639.
I'8Because distributions in bankruptcy are on a pro ratabasis, 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (Supp. IV
1980), the amount available for distribution to each class of creditors would be increased by the
inclusion of the otherwise exempt asset. Thus, the creditor whose claim was denied would
receive only that distribution allowed for the class to which he was relegated.
131

'3'
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after bankruptcy.1 37 As such, the measure affords a direct benefit to
the debtor. Moreover, although a nonpossessory nonpurchase-money
security interest is indeed recognized as a form of security interest
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,13 8 creditors who
use such devices do not retain or take title to the property purportedly
serving as collateral.13 This is in sharp contrast to the position of the
creditor in Holt whose agreement with the eventual bankrupt specified that the sprinkler system was to remain the property of the
creditor until it was paid for. 140 These differences as to retention of
title and parties benefited would warrant the Court's distinguishing
Holt v. Henley and not viewing it as dispositive.
If Holt is removed as an impediment to applying bankruptcy
legislation retroactively to preexisting rights, the need to reach the
constitutional issues raised by retroactive application of section
522(f)(2) becomes clear. Moreover, because the Court has set forth at
length its position on the underlying constitutional issue even as it
declined to decide it, the analytical approach employed should be
examined. In considering the legislation, the Court engaged in a
Radford analysis and applied a just compensation standard thereunder. Although it is tempting to characterize the impairment of a
lien through bankruptcy legislation as governmental action which
forces certain individuals to bear a burden which should be borne by
the public at large,' 4 1 the avoidance of creditor devices which frustrate the rehabilitative ends of the federal bankruptcy power simply
does not amount to a compensable taking as that notion has historically been understood. While precisely what constitutes a taking has
been largely determined on a case-by-case basis, 42 traditionally certain factors have been examined by the courts. These include the use
for which the property is appropriated and its economic effect on the
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
In this connection, the Court noted that while the Uniform Commercial Code may set
priorities based on possession or the purchase-money nature of a security interest, neither lack of
possession nor lack of a purchase money relationship makes the lien any less a security interest.
Rather, the Court looked to the definitional section of the Code and found that Congress, in
defining a lien, made no distinctions based on possession or a purchase money relationship. 103
S. Ct. at 411 n.6. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(28) (Supp. IV 1980).
'3 See supra note 20.
140 232 U.S. at 638. See also supra note 113.
Although the Supreme Court has been unable to decide on a definition of what constitutes
a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment, one of the most commonly quoted
formulations is found in Armstrong v. United States. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). There the Court
declared that "[t]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole." Id. at 49.
"42See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
'3
'3
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individual property owner, the unexpected interference with property
rights, and the disproportionate impact on the individual affected. 43
Applying these factors to the liens avoided under section 522(f),
the conclusion may be drawn that first, although the economic effect
on a creditor whose lien is avoided may not be de minimis, the
avoidance of a nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security interest in
personal property and household goods to the extent it infringes on
what Congress has perceived to be necessary for a fresh start does not
amount to the total or substantial deprivation of a property right 144
contemplated by the takings clause. Second, although the rehabilitation of debtors is a matter of public concern,1 45 the enlargement of the
rights of debtors against the rights of their creditors does not represent
a taking of private property for a public use. 46 Third, because the
possibility of a debtor's filing in bankruptcy is at least implicitly
contemplated in every extension of credit, and because Congress'
power to discharge debtors from their legal liabilities is universally
acknowledged, 47 the interference with such liens cannot be characterized as wholly unexpected. 4 Finally, the nature of the particular

143 Penn

Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

144See, e.g., In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 456-59 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404,

418-19 (D. Utah 1981).
145 Obviously, providing debtors with the basic necessities in the interest of preventing their
becoming public charges after a discharge in bankruptcy works to support the economic wellbeing of the public at large. The term "public use," however, has an entirely different connotation as evidenced by the cases in which a taking for a public use was alleged. See, e.g., Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (designation of private premises as
landmark thereby prohibiting certain uses not taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946) (government authorization of direct overflights impairing use of land as chicken farm
constitutes taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (order that diseased ornamental trees
be cut down to prevent damage to fruit-bearing trees not taking); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (prohibition on mining of coal causing subsidence of house, except
under certain conditions constitutes taking); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1971) (repeated flooding of land due to water projects amounts to taking). The debtor in Radford alleged
that even if the moratorium on mortgage foreclosure proceedings constituted a substantial
impairment of the mortgagee's rights, the legislation was not unreasonable because it was
enacted for "a permissible public purpose," i.e., to permit farmers to retain possession of their
farms. 295 U.S. at 598. This argument may have been largely responsible for the confusion
between matters in the public interest and the public use doctrine because it was in reply to this
argument that the Court made its frequently quoted statement that "however great the Nation's
need, private property shall not be thus taken even for a wholly public use without just
compensation." Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
148 See In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Ashe, 669 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1982);
see also 103 S.Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117 See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
48 One of the recurring factors to which the Supreme Court has pointed in its effort to define
a taking is "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). With
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devices whose avoidance is authorized and the role such devices play
in the debtor-creditor relationship militate against the argument that
impairment of such interests visits economic injury on a disproportionately small number of persons. 49 Rather, they tend to support the
view that the avoidance of such liens is an integral part of an economic regulatory scheme. Thus, as even the three-member concurrence recognized in this case,150 a "takings" analysis is clearly inappropriate.
The Government's apparent effort to persuade the Court that
contract rights and property rights are synonymous for due process
purposes,' 5' and the Court's refusal to consider the nature and effect
of the legislation in question, may have prompted the Court to try to
force this case into the somewhat outdated mold of Radford. By
restricting itself to the Radford "takings" rationale, the Court overlooked subsequent decisions that reflected an effort on its part to
accommodate socioeconomic legislation within the overall due process
context. However convinced the Supreme Court may have been in
1935 that enabling a mortgagor to remain in possession of mortgaged
premises while foreclosure proceedings were stayed impermissibly enlarged the rights of debtors as against their creditors in violation of
fifth amendment due process guarantees, 52 it retreated from this
position in subsequent decisions. Most notably, in Wright v. Vinton
Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, ' 5 1 the Court upheld a slightly
amended form of substantially the same legislation. 54 The Court's

regard to the expectations of creditors who use the devices covered by section 522(f), it is clear
that the resort of debtors to such drastic means of obtaining credit by which they often waive
rights to exemptions unwittingly should put creditors on notice that the debtors' insolvency may
be imminent. With bankruptcy being more than a remote possibility, such creditors may be
charged with knowledge that their interests may be impaired by current and future bankruptcy
laws. See, e.g., In re Prima Co., 88 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1937).
141 As the "taking" cases indicate, the governmental action in question generally affects a
single individual or a limited group of individuals in a geographic proximity. See soupra note 145.
Bankruptcy legislation, on the other hand, affects the public at large and is aimed at recurring
practices and remedies that are inextricably linked to the health of the national economy.
103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'5' Id. at 410-11. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
152 See Radford, 295 U.S. at 580.
53 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
15 Under the amended version of the legislation, proceedings against the mortgagor would be
stayed for a period of three years, rather than five years, with the mortgagor to remain in
possession subject to the court's control. 300 U.S. at 460. During this period, the mortgagor was
to pay a "reasonable rental," with the first payment to be made within one year of the issuance of
the stay order. Id. at 467. The rent was to cover taxes and maintenance, with the remainder to
be distributed to the mortgagor's creditors. Id. at 461-62. The court was granted the power to
terminate the stay and order a sale in the event of default by the mortgagor. Id. at 462. In
upholding the constitutionality of the legislation, the Court noted that the amended statute
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departure from Radjord in only two years evidenced an expanded
view of the scope of Congress' bankruptcy powers. In Radford the
Court had considered anything less than full payment of the indebtedness with interest to constitute a prohibited impairment of the mortgagee's rights. 55 The Court in Wright, however, giving greater deference to Congress' broad powers under the bankruptcy clause to pursue
debtor rehabilitation, declared that a provision resulting in a modification of the mortgagee's rights would be upheld provided such modi56
fication were not "unreasonable."
The shift in focus in Wright and later decisions represented not so
much a diminishing regard for previously acquired rights as a recognition of the breadth of Congress' powers under the bankruptcy clause
and the economic realities of the debtor-creditor relationship.1 7 The
preserved most of the mortgagee's rights that had been found to be impaired in Radford. Id. at
458. For an enumeration of these rights, see supra note 76. The Court indicated that Radford did
not require the preservation of all five rights. Rather, said the Court, "the effect of the statute in
its entirety was to deprive the mortgagee of his property without due process of law." 300 U.S. at
457. Finding no substantial modification of the mortgagee's rights, the Court declared:
A court of bankruptcy may affect the interests of lien holders in many ways. To carry
out the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, it may direct that all liens upon property be
marshalled, or that the property be sold free of encumbrances and the rights of all
lien holders be transferred to the proceeds of the sale. Despite the peremptory terms
of a pledge, it may enjoin sale of the collateral, if it finds that the sale would hinder
or delay preparation or consummation of a plan of reorganization. It may enjoin like
action by a mortgagee which would defeat the purpose of subsection(s) to effect
rehabilitation of the former mortgagor.
Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
In addressing the applicability of Radford as controlling authority, the Supreme Court, in
the instant case, made no reference to Wright, The Tenth Circuit, for its part, noted that while
cases such as Wright "may well refine the rule of Radford, . . . they do not destroy [its]
fundamental teaching . . ." 642 F.2d at 1198. Other courts, however, have found that Wright
has substantially limited the scope of Radford. See, e.g., In re Gifford, 668 F.2d 447 (7th Cir.
1982); In re Ashe, 669 F.2d 105 (3rd Cir. 1982); In re Rapp, 16 Bankr. 575 (S.D. Fla. 1981); In
re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404 (D. Utah 1981); see also V. WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1932-1949
(1951).
155 295 U.S. at 580; see supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
156 300 U.S. at 470; see supra note 154.
157 See, e.g., Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1937). Here the statute
challenged extended the period for a foreclosure sale provided by state law to mortgagors. Id. at
504. The party who had purchased the property at the judicial sale contended that such an
extension violated fifth amendment due process guarantees. Id. at 515. In upholding the legislation, the Court emphasized the rehabilitative goal of the statute and of bankruptcy legislation
generally. Id. at 514. Moreover, the Court noted that any suggestion that Congress cannot alter
property rights is "futile" because "bankruptcy proceedings constantly modify and affect the
property rights established by state law." Id. at 517. In this regard, the Court declared that
property rights are not immune from impairment through the exercise of Congress' bankruptcy
powers merely because they have arisen under state law. Rather, Congress may, in the exercise
of its powers, direct a bankrupt court to affect property rights within the limits of due process.
Id. at 518; see also V. WOOD, supra note 154.
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Court was beginning to look at precisely what rights particular legislation abridged and what rights it preserved,'-" a process involving
consideration of whether specific legislation affected the remedy for
enforcing the debt or indeed affected the underlying debt. This approach, which is reflected in the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, 15 9 would require the Court to look closely at the nature of the
obligation and the purpose and effect of the statute claimed to impair
it. This task involves more than merely drawing a line between traditional contract rights and traditional property rights and categorically
invalidating all legislation intended to apply retroactively to the latter. By the same token, respect for basic constitutional principles
would require that some distinction between the two be preserved.
This flexibility seemed to elude the Court in the instant case. The
Government appeared to be arguing that because contract rights had
in the past been raised to the level of property rights under certain
circumstances and afforded increased protection, then under other
circumstances property rights may be lowered to the level of contract
rights and afforded decreased protection.160 The Government was not
contending, as the Court understood it to be,' 6 ' that the interest of the
nonpossessory nonpurchase-money lienholder was something other
than a property interest. Rather, what the Government suggested was
that although the lienholder had acquired a property interest in the
household items securing the loan, such property interest was "insubstantial." 6 2 Consequently, the impairment thereof was not a compen158 See, e.g., Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 516 (1938) (rights of
purchaser preserved, possibility of enjoyment merely delayed); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299
U.S. 445, 452 (1937) (fifth amendment does not prohibit legislation affecting creditor's remedy
for enforcing debt if statute effects "fair, reasonable and equitable distribution of [debtor's]
assets."); Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1936)
(question is whether statute modifies "secured creditor's rights, remedial or substantive").
'5
See 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'8
See id. at 410-11; see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
'6' See id. at 411; see supra notes 89 & 90 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. at 411. The attempt to characterize the property interest of the nonpossessory
'6
nonpurchase- money lienholder as insubstantial has evoked comment on both sides of the issue as
attempts have been made to determine what "substantial" means. Certain courts have held the
lien to be "insubstantial" because the collateral supporting it has only de minimis value. See,
e.g., In re Rapp, 16 Bankr. 575, 579 (S.D. Fla, 1981); In re Ward, 14 Bankr. 549, 562 (S.D. Ga.
1981); In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404, 419 (D. Utah 1981). This assertion has been countered with
the argument that due process protection is not predicated on the dollar value of the collateral.
See, e.g., In re Webber, 674 F.2d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 1982).
Other courts have held the lien to be "insubstantial" because its value lies in the threat of
foreclosure. See, e.g., In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1982); see also 103 S. Ct. at 415
(Blackmun, J., concurring). This focus on the motives of the creditor has been criticized as
"draw[ing] a distinction too fine for the Constitution to permit." Note, supra note 7, at 1632; see
also In re Gifford, 668 F.2d 447, 468 (7th Cir. 1982) (Pell, J., dissenting).
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sable taking. 6 3 While the Government's attempt to equate contract
rights and property rights may have obscured its contention with
regard to the substantiality of the lienholders' interest, its basic approach was sound. Yet in its determination to cast this as a violation of
the takings clause within the meaning of Radford-which has itself
been criticized for having misapplied the takings clause-the majority
failed to consider the very nature of the interests, namely that they
attach to no specific property but rather to a general fund of property,
if any.16 4 This the concurrence recognized. 6 5
The lower courts that have upheld the constitutionality of the
provision have focused on the nature of the interest avoided and
concluded that this type of interest, although arguably recognized as a
property interest under state law, 66 does not rise to the level of
property as contemplated by the fifth amendment guarantee against
retroactive impairment. 67 Of particular importance is the fact that
these interests apply generally and, as Justice Blackmun noted, "as a
practicable matter, there is nothing to prevent the debtor's selling the
property and replacing it or not replacing it, just as he chooses." 6 8
Thus, since the nonpossessory nonpurchase-money lienholder cannot
prevent the disposition of the debtor's personal property, 69 the lienholder may be left with no meaningful lien at all. This is in sharp
contrast to a mortgage or purchase-money security interest under
which specific property is dedicated to the satisfaction of the underlying debt. 70 Moreover, again unlike the mortgage or purchase-money

"I 103

S. Ct. at 411.

As a practical matter, because the lien is a blanket interest in all of the debtor's personal
property, the fund of property to which it attaches may change on a regular basis, and in fact
may be depleted over the life of the loan. For a discussion of the general as opposed to the specific
nature of the lien, see Comment, supra note 3, at 643-44; see also In re Mahoney, 15 Bankr. 482,
484 (W.D.N.C. 1981); In re Ward, 14 Bankr. 549, 563 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
66 In the instant case, the fact that a nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security interest is
considered to be property under state law was not even disputed. Id. at 411 n.6.
"7 See, e.g.. In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 457-59 (7th Cir. 1982): In re Ward, 14 Bankr. 549,
562-63 (S.D. Ga. 1981); In re Paden, 10 Bankr. 206, 209 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Pillow, 8 Bankr.
404, 418-19 (D. Utah 1981).
1S 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
164

16

Id.

170It is in the nature of a mortgage, for example, that the mortgagee obtains an indefeasible
interest in the specific property described in the mortgage instrument. There is no question,
furthermore, that a mortgagee is a priority creditor only as to the specific property described in
the mortgage agreement and may not assert a priority interest in any other real property to
satisfy the mortgage debt. If the value of the mortgaged property is insufficient to satisfy the
debt, the mortgagee becomes a general unsecured creditor for the amount of the deficiency
unless the mortgagee has taken steps to assure itself of a priority position with regard to other real
or personal property. 1 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES § 5.1 (1943). This relationship between the
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security interest where the value of the collateral is directly proportionate to the amount of the debt, the value of the household goods
bears little relationship, if any, to the amount of the debt they purportedly secure.17 ' Finally, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, reflecting the view of the lower courts upholding the provision, the lien has
"little direct value and weight in its own right." 172 It serves as leverage
in the debtor-creditor relationship, 7 3 rather than affording the creditor reasonable prospects for the satisfaction of his debt. 74 Even the
majority acknowledged this, 7 but its dedication to the takings analysis prevented it from exploring the implications of this aspect.
It is somewhat simplistic to resolve this issue by arguing that
because a compensable taking was found in Radford where there was
only a partial destruction of the mortgagee's rights, then a fortiori
section 522(f)(2) works an impermissible taking because "the governmental action . . .would result in a complete destruction of the property right of the secured party."'' 76 Such an argument ignores the
economic realities of the respective situations. Even assuming that the
action in Radford was properly characterized as a taking, the Court
must, as Congress clearly did, recognize the distinction between a

specific property and the funds advanced also exists with a purchase money security interest
pursuant to which the seller of a particular article may retain an interest in the article to secure
payment or a party advancing the funds for the purchase of an item may retain an interest in the
property acquired. First Hardin Nat'l Bank v. Damron, 5 Bankr. 357, 358 (W.D. Ky. 1980).
171 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J.,concurring); see In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 456-57 (7th
Cir. 1982); In re Ward, 14 Bankr. 549, 561 (S.D. Ga. 1981); In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404, 419 (D.
Utah 1981); In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395, 399 (N.D. Ohio 1980); see also H.R. REP., supra note
1, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6087-88; Note, supra note 87, at 130001.
72 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"I H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 608788.
1Id;
see also In re Cifford, 688 F.2d 447, 456 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395,
400 (N.D. Ohio 1980). In discussing the value of a nonpossessory nonpurchase-money lien, the
latter court noted:
A creditor who makes a loan and takes a nonpurchase-money security interest in
highly depreciable household goods as security for the loan, does not actually take
the household goods as security for the loan because there is no belief by the creditor
that the household goods are worth the amount of the loan . . . . Thus, such creditor is rarely willing to take the household goods in lieu of the debt in case of default.
Id. Most courts upholding retroactive application of section 522(f)(2) have subscribed to this
view. For a criticism of this view, see Note, supra note 7, at 1632.
"5 103 S. Ct. at 412.
176 Id.
at 411; see also Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir. 1981),
afj'd sub nom. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982); In re Glynn, 13
Bankr. 647, 650 (D.S.C. 1981); In re Jackson, 4 Bankr. 293 (D. Colo. 1980), affd sub nor.
Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), affd sub nor. United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982); Note, supra note 7, at 1631.
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mortgage on real property and the desperation-type consumer financing covered by section 522(f)(2). This approach also overlooks the fact
that there is some precedent for viewing the issue as one of economic
regulation. 77 Such an approach was adopted by the Third Circuit in
its decision in In re Ashe,178 which employed a radically different
standard of review to reach a contrary conclusion. While the Third
Circuit's opinion may be criticized for having adopted what is perhaps
an excessively broad view of the bankruptcy power, 17 9 its view of
bankruptcy legislation as inherently retroactive and its characterization of section 522(f) as an economic regulation raise issues that the
Court should have addressed in the instant case. Although the threemember concurrence recognized that "the statute is essentially economic regulation and insubstantial at that," 8 0 the majority did not
even entertain the idea that the measure might be viewed as something other than a taking for a public use without just compensation.
Yet if economic regulation is defined as legislation "adjusting the
burdens and benefits of economic life," 181 there is at least equal, if not
greater, justification for examining section 522(f) on the basis of something other than a takings analysis.
In enacting section 522(f), Congress has taken what is essentially
an economic relationship and examined how that relationship impedes the congressional purpose of ensuring debtors a fresh start in
bankruptcy. Because the types of liens whose avoidance is authorized
deny debtors what are truly the basic necessities, Congress has seen fit
to shift the burden of the commercial relationship to a certain extent
to the creditor by denying the latter this particular remedy for enforcing the debt. 8 2 If, by relegating the creditor to the status of an
103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
669 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1982).
179 That Judge Gibbons recognized very few limitations on the bankruptcy power is evidenced
by his suggestion that Congress may impair mortgages if it sees fit. See id. Regardless of the
current view on the applicability of Radford, all courts have recognized that at some point
Congress' power to impair rights in bankruptcy is limited by the nature of the interest retained.
Serious obstacles are usually erected to avoid the impairment of mortgages. See text accompanying notes 170-71.
180103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
181 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). Many courts have relied on
the Usery formulation to uphold the validity of section 522(f). See, e.g., In re Gifford, 688 F.2d
447 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Paden, 10 Bankr. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395
(N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Beck, 4 Bankr. 661 (C.D. I11.). appeal dismissed, 642 F.2d 1196 (7th
Cir. 1980).
182 According to Justice Blackmun, the measure affects the nonpossessory nonpurchase-money
lienholder's remedy and not the underlying debt. 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
see also In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395, 401 (D. Ohio 1980); In re VanGorkon, 4 Bankr. 689, 691
(D.S.D. 1980).
,
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unsecured creditor for that portion of the debt, Congress has effectively eliminated the nonpossessory nonpurchase-money creditor's
prospects for satisfaction of the debt,1 8 3 such a result is merely inciden84
tal to the legitimate exercise of congressional power.
Such an approach subjects section 522(f) to constitutional scrutiny on two levels. First, although the assumption is that bankruptcy
legislation is inherently retroactive, the provision must nonetheless be
tested by the standard applicable to all legislation operating retroactively, namely whether the "retroactive effects are so wholly unexpected and disruptive that harsh and oppressive consequences follow.' 8 5 Second, once retroactive application is found to be
permissible, the provision must be tested by the standard applicable to
all economic legislation, namely whether there is any set of facts
tending to support "the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators." 86 With
regard to the former standard, the Supreme Court indicated in its
1976 decision in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining, 87 a case involving
the imposition of a new obligation in connection with a former employment relationship,' 88 that "legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations."' 89 Clearly, the possibility of bankruptcy is inherent in every
extension of credit. This is particularly true in the last-resort type of
financing that gives rise to nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security

"I Because the creditors in such circumstances would receive only a nominal amount as
general unsecured creditors, see supra text accompanying notes 49-50, it has been argued that a
total deprivation occurs. See sources cited supra note 176. Other courts that have specifically
addressed the issue of the changed status do not agree. For example, the Seventh Circuit noted
that "Congress has not entirely destroyed Thorp's [the creditor] expectation of repayment but
instead has substituted for it the rights of an unsecured creditor, which need not be equal in
value to the expectations allegedly taken." In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 459 (7th Cir. 1982).
8 In re Ashe, 669 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447, 460 (7th Cir. 1982);
In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404, 420 (D. Utah 1981); In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395, 400 (D. Ohio
1980).
"I In re Financial Inc., 594 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1979).
'81 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). See supra note 25.
1', 428 U.S. 1 (1976). Usery involved a constitutional challenge to certain provisions of federal
mining legislation requiring coal mine operators to compensate miners, former miners, and their
survivors for death or total disability due to black lung disease resulting from their employment
in the mines. The mine operators objected to the allocation of financial responsibility for the
payment of death or disability payments for individuals who had ceased to work for them before
the law was enacted. Id. at 12.
18I Retroactive legislation is defined as a statute "which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past." In re Ward, 14 Bankr. 549,
557-58 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (quoting 16A, AM. JUn. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 661, at 641 (1979)).
"I9 Usery, 428 U.S. at 16.
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interests in personal property and household goods. And just as
clearly, creditors traditionally have been charged with knowledge of
Congress' power to affect their rights through the enactment of legislation in the area of bankruptcy. 19 0 Hence the impairment resulting
from retroactive application of section 522(f) cannot properly be characterized as unexpected. With regard to the latter standard, the nature of the interest avoided191 and the purpose served by such avoidance 92 demonstrate that Congress has indeed developed a rational
way to balance the competing interests inherent in the debtor-creditor
relationship. Were Congress eventually to diminish creditors' rights to
the point of providing for debtors in excess of their needs, the congressional action might not withstand rational basis scrutiny. Such is not
the case, however, with the legislation in question here.
The Court obviously had some justification for disposing of the
instant case through statutory construction. Its decision, however,
may well prompt Congress to clarify its intent regarding retroactive
application. Should Congress declare that the statute is indeed to
operate retroactively, the Court's position on the constitutionality of
the provision as thus applied is evident: that retroactive application of
section 522(f) would result in a taking of private property for a public
use without just compensation. 9 3 It is this aspect of the Court's decision that presents the greatest problem, for such a position fails to give
due weight to the Court's own expanding view of the scope of the
bankruptcy clause, in general, and the economic purpose of section
522(f) in particular.
M. Sheilah O'Halloran
190See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 516 (1937); see also, In re Prima,
88 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1937). In the latter case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
noted that legislation in the area of debtor relief is subject to different constitutional limitations
than legislation affecting other rights and obligations in the debtor-creditor relationship. Indeed,
said the court, the debtor and creditor "were and are chargeable with knowledge that their
rights and remedies, in case the debtor becomes insolvent, and is adjudicated a bankrupt, are
affected by existing bankruptcy laws and all future lawful bankruptcy legislation which might be
enacted." Id.
191See supra notes 118-28, 137-39, & 164-75 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 1, 2, 104, 124 & 128 and accompanying text.
191103 S. Ct. at 411-12.

